Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2002

Mountain States Casing Service and/or State
Insurance Fund v. Jerry L. McKean and/or
Industrial Commission of Utah : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mary Cororon; Chris Nichols; Attorney for Respondenets; .
James R. Black; Mary A. Rudolph; Attorney for State Insurance;
Stephen Schwendiman; Assistant Attorney General.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, State Insurance Fund v. McKean, No. 20508.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1991

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

DOCUMENT
- - <j
--WARY C. CORPORON #734
_
.SCHRIS D. NICHOLS #4393 2-05U
£ Attorneys for Respondent
CORPORON & WILLIAMS
Suite 1100 - Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 328-1162

^
&

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH.

MOUNTAIN STATES CASING SERVICE
and/or STATE INSURANCE FUND,

BRIEF OF
APPLICANT/RESPONDENT

Defendants/Appellants,
-vsJERRY L. McKEAN and/or
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,

Supreme Court No. 20508

Applicant/Respondents.

MARY C. CORPORON
CHRIS D. NICHOLS
Attorneys for Respondent
Suite 1100 - Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

JAMES R. BLACK
MARY A. RUDOLPH
Attorneys for Appellants
261 East 300 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

STEPHEN SCHWENDIMAN
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

1

1 Earn Hassan Era

MAY 2 91935
Cork, Supreme Court, Utah
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

MARY C. CORPORON #734
CHRIS D. NICHOLS #4393
Attorneys for Respondent
CORPORON & WILLIAMS
Suite 1100 - Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 328-1162

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH.

MOUNTAIN STATES CASING SERVICE
and/or STATE INSURANCE FUND,

BRIEF OF
APPLICANT/RESPONDENT

Defendants/Appellants,
-vsJERRY L. McKEAN and/or
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,

Supreme Court No. 20508

Applicant/Respondents.

MARY C. CORPORON
CHRIS D. NICHOLS
Attorneys for Respondent
Suite 1100 - Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

JAMES R. BLACK
MARY A. RUDOLPH
Attorneys for Appellants
261 East 300 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

STEPHEN SCHWENDIMAN
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Dutton v. Industrial Ctamtission of Arizona,
140 Ariz 448, 682 P.2d 453 (1984)
Fruehauf Trailer Company v, Industrial Conmlssion,
16 Utah 2d 95, 396 P.2d 409 (1964)
Grable v. Weyerhaeuser,
55 Or.App. 627, 639 P.2d 677, 678 (1982)
Perchelli v. Utah State Industrial Commission,
25 Utah U 58, 475 P.2d 835 (1970)
Randolph v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours Company,
130 N.J.L. 353, 33 A.2d 301 (1943)
Sullivan v, B, & A. Construction, Inc.,
122 N.Y.S.2d 571 rev'g 307 N.Y. 161, 120 N.E.2d 694 (1954)

OTHER AUIHORITIES
Larson, Vol. I, Section 13.11(d)
Larson, Vol. I, Section 13

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1

ARGUMENT

2

POINT I
THE SUBSEQUENT INJURY TO THE APPLICANT WAS A
RESULT OF THE PRIMARY INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT AND
WAS SUSTAINED DURING THE "QUASI-COURSE OF
EMPLOYMENT"

2

POINT II
THE CHAIN OF CAUSATION FROM THE PRIMARY
INDUSTRIAL INJURY WAS NOT BROKEN BY
APPLICANT'S CONDUCT
CONCLUSION

4
9

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

MARY C. CORPORON #734
CHRIS D. NICHOLS #4393
Attorneys for Respondent
CORPORON & WILLIAMS
Suite 1100 - Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 328-1162

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH.

MOUNTAIN STATES CASING SERVICE
and/or STATE INSURANCE FUND,

BRIEF OF
APPLICANT/RESPONDENT

Defendants/Appellants,
-vsJERRY L. McKEAN and/or
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,

Supreme Court No. 20508

Applicant/Respondents.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent
Commission's

respectfully

requests

that

the

Industrial

denial of appellant's Motion for Review be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Respondents

accept

the

statements

of

the case and of the

facts presented by the Appellants' Brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Administrative Law Judge's finding that respondent, Jerry
McKean's,
employment"

burn

injury occurred

is proper

and

within

the

"quasi-course

of

his injury is therefore compensable.
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Respondent
the

McKean's

injury i s compensable also on the basis that

subsequent burn injury was a d i r e c t and n a t u r a l r e s u l t of the

primary injury to Mr. McKean's arm.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SUBSEQUENT INJURY TO THE APPLICANT WAS A RESULT
OF THE PRIMARY INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT AND WAS SUSTAINED
DURING THE "QUASI-COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT.11
Appellants

contend

that

the Administrative Law Judge based

his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order solely upon the
basis

of

Professor

Larson's

analysis

of

the "quasi-course of

employment1' concept. Appellants further contend that the concept
of "quasi-course of employment" is not a part of Utah law and that
even if such a concept was a part of Utah law it was misapplied in
the instant case.
The Administrative
Fact

and

Conclusions

"quasi-course
his

Law Judge

of

treatise

of

Law

solely

upon

the

theory

of

employment" as put forth by Professor Larson in
of workman's

"quasi-course

did not base his Findings of

of

compensation.

employment" was

only

one

The
basis

theory

of

for

the

Adninistrative Law Judge's Findings. The Administrative Law Judge
had also found that the applicant was n<?t negligent in his conduct
and, therefore, there was no break in the chain of causation, thus
finding

that

the

primary injury.
Law Judge

subsequent

injury was directly related to the

Thus, even if it is found that the Adninistrative

committed

error in finding that Mr. McKean's injuries
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a result of "quasi-course of employment,11 his decision would

were
still

stand

since

there was also a finding that the subsequent

injury was a result of the industrial injury and was not based on
any negligence of Mr. McKean.
Appellants
that
of

Utah

contend

that there is no Utah case law that show

has adopted Professor Larson's theory of "quasi-course

employment." Appellants, however, have failed to show any Utah

cases

that

specifically

reject

the concept of "quasi-course of

employment.11
Professor

Larson

defined

his

concept

of "quasi-course of

employment" as follows:
Activities undertaken by the employee following
upon his injury which, although they take place outside
the time and space limits of employment, would not be
considered employment activities for usual purposes, are
nevertheless related to the employment in the sense that
they are necessary reasonable activities that would not
have been undertaken but for the compensable injury.
Larson, Volume I, Section 13.11(d).
An
break

injury
the

chain may
applicant

arising

of a quasi-course activity does not

causal chain by mere negligence of the applicant. The
only

be

broken

which would

prohibited

out

by

the

be

by

the

regarded

employer.

intentional
as

conduct of the

expressly and impliedly

Thus, under the quasi-course of

employment concept, more than mere negligence must be shown on the
part

of the applicant to establish that the causal chain had been

broken.
Appellants

would contend that the quasi-course of employment
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test

should

that

a

not

be

stricter

applied in the instant case and would argue

test

should

be

applied,

providing that mere

negligence is sufficient to break the causal chain where an injury
did not arise out of the quasi-course of employment.
The Administrative Law Judge found that the activities of Mr.
McKean

were necessary and reasonable and, thus, did not break the

chain

of

(R.100).
and

causation

under

the

quasi-course

employment

test.

The activities undertaken by Mr. McKean were necessary

were

daily activities. Cooking, repairing an automobile and

repairing

a steam radiator for heating purposes are all necessary

and

reasonable

activities

supporting

the

quasi-course

of

employment theory.
POINT II
THE CHAIN OF CAUSATION FROM THE PRIMARY INDUSTRIAL
INJURY WAS NOT BROKEN BY APPLICANT'S CONDUCT.
Appellants

are

correct

in

stating

the general

rule for

compensation for injuries that are the result of an aggravation of
the

original

injury

arising

industrial
as

injury.

a natural

It

result

is well settled that any
of

the primary injury is

compensable. Professor Larson has stated:
When the primary injury is shown to have arisen out
of and in the course of employment, every natural
consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises
out of the employment, unless it is the result of an
independent,
intervening
cause
attributable to
claimant's own intentional conduct. Larson, Volume I,
Section 13.
Under

Professor Larson's analysis, any injury arising out of
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a

quasi-course

negligence.

of

activity

However, an

will not

injury

that

be deemed broken by mere
does not arise out of a

quasi-course of employment activity may be deemed to be the result
of

a

broken

chain of causation where the applicant is negligent

misconduct.
Appellants
compensation
his

that Mr. McKean

is not

entitled

to

for his subsequent burn injury, due to negligence on

part.

experiencing

contend

Appellants

contend

that

since Mr. McKean was

numbness in his right arm and hand he was aware that

he had no feeling in that arm and hand and, therefore, should have
taken reasonable precautions against further injury.
Appellants

cite to the cases of Randolph v. E. I, Du Pont De

Nemours Co,, 130 N.J.L. 353, 33 A.2d 301 (1943) and Sullivan v. B.
&

Inc., 122 N.Y.S.2d 571, revfg 307

A. Construction ,

N.Y.

161, 120 N.E.2d 694 (1954), to illustrate that compensation

will not be allowed to an applicant if negligence is shown on his
part.

At

nine of appellants1 brief they contend that the

page

Sullivan

case

Sullivan

case dealt with a claimant whose right knee occasionally

locked,

is applicable to the present fact situation. The

rendering

his

leg

useless.

In the Sullivan case, the

claimant's

right

unable

apply his brakes, and an accident occurred. The court

in

to

that

case

compensable
condition

due

knee locked while driving an automobile, he was

found
to

that

the

claimant's

injuries were not

his negligence since he had knowledge of his

from simlar experiences in the past. The Sullivan case
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is not

applicable

McKean

arm

his

injury

present fact situation however. Mr.

and hand. Mr. McKean had never burned his hand prior to

doctor

had

return

to

by

the

had no prior knowledge as to the loss of feeling or use in

his

have

to

of April

6.

In fact, Mr. McKean testified that his

informed

him

that his feeling would slowly begin to

his

arm

and he further testified that he did in fact

seme feeling in the arm.

Thus, based on the statements made

his doctor and by his prior experiences in the use of his hand

and

arm, Mr. McKean believed that he could proceed to use his arm

in daily
his

activities.

arm

and

hand,

Since Mr. McKean did have some feeling in

he

felt there would be no serious threat to

damaging the arm and hand further.
Thus,
closely
case

the

fact

related

to

situations

in

the

present

those in the Randolph case.

case are more
In the Randolph

the claimant had an eye injury and was required to wear dark

glasses.
because

He

fell

his vision

aggravation

down
was

the

stairs

impaired

of his home late at night

due to the dark glasses. The

of his eye injury resulting from the fall was held to

be a natural consequence of the original industrial injury and was
thus compensable.
In
that

supporting

"if

a

this

reasonably

decision,

the court in Sullivan stated

prudent person innocently aggravates the

harmful effect of the original injury, the original wrongful cause
continues
Randolph

to

the

end,

and

accomplishes

the

final result."

v. E. E. Du Pont De Nemours Co., 130 N.J.L. 353, 33 A.2d
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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302

Mr. McKean!s injuries were the result of a loss of

(1943).

feeling in his arm and hand which was a consequence of his primary
industrial

injury.

Thus, under the Randolph analysis, the chain

of causation is not broken in the present case.
McKean!s

Mr.

conduct

was not unreasonable in light of his

previous knowledge as to his condition and thus any conduct on the
part of Mr. McKean contributing to the injury cannot be considered
to

be negligent.

140 Ariz.

In Dutton v. Industrial Commission of Arizona,

448, 682 P.2d

compensation

453

(1984),

the

test

for allowing

for consequences arising out of an industrial injury

was put forth.
First,
a direct causal relationship must be
establised between the initial industrial injury and the
subsequent condition.
Second, when the claimant1s
conduct
contributes
to the incident causing the
subsequent injury, his conduct must have been reasonable
in light of his knowledge of his previous physical
condition. 682 P.2d at t 456.
Both
case.

elements of the above test are satisfied in the present

As has been pointed out above, if it had not been for the

original
feeling

industrial
in his

accident, Mr. McKean would not have lost the

arm and hand and would have been able to prevent

any subsequent burn injuries to his hand. Furthermore, Mr. McKean
had

some

that

the

arm

feeling in his arm and hand, and was told by his doctor
feeling

would slowly return to the injured area of his

and hand. Mr. McKean had never burned his arm and hand prior

to the April 6 incident. Thus his conduct was reasonable based on
his past experiences.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Appellants
Industrial
Perchelli

cite

to the cases of Fruehauf Trailer Company v.

Conmission,

16 Utah

2d

95, 396 P.2d 409 (1964) and

v. Utah State Industrial Commission, 25 Utah 2d 58, 475

P.2d 835 (1970), as establishing the Utah position in compensation
for

subsequent

Respondents

injuries

do

not

cause

the

of

result

connected."
present

which

an

of

an industrial injury.

In fact, the Fruehauf and Perchelli cases

respondents position.

aggravating

out

dispute the findings of the Supreme court in

Fruehauf and Perchelli.
support

arising

In Fruehauf it was stated that "an

flares up a previous injury need not be

accident

which

is

independently employment

396 P.2d at 410. This is clearly applicable to the

case.

Appellants

would argue that the present case is

distinguishable from Fruehauf and Perchelli in that Mr. McKean was
negligent

in failing to put protection on his right arm and hand.

However, Mr. McKean acted as a reasonable and prudent person would
under
wear

similar circumstances.
heat-resistent

gloves

It is not common for individuals to
while

working

Therefore, Mr. McKeanfs

cooking.

on

failure

cars nor

while

to wear protective

coverings on his arm and hand cannot be considered to be rash.
Mr.

McKean1s activities were considered to be reasonable and

necessary daily activities. His conduct in participating in those
activities

cannot

be

considered

activity that was necessary.
applicant

should

activities.

to

be negligent.

Each was an

It is unrealistic to expect that the

refrain

from

participating

in

the above

It is also unreasonable in light of his knowledge at

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the

time to have expected him to wear heat resistent gloves while

participating

in his

reasonable

and

circimstances.
the burn

daily

activities.

prudent

Mr. McKean acted as a

person would

have

under

similar

It is unlikely that Mr. McKean would have received

injury

if he

had not received his on-the-job injury.

Thus, the State Insurance Fund and Mr. McKeanfs employer should be
held
of

liable for all expenses incurred by Mr. McKean for treatment
the burn

injury

suffers

an

resulting

from

the

on-the-job

injury

and

thereafter

"Where a worker
the

condition

that injury is worsened by an off-the-job injury,

compensation

worker's

to his right arm and hand.

insurance

compensation

carrier should be required to afford

benefits for the worsened condition if the

worker shows that the on-the-job injury is a material contributing
cause

of

Or.App.
burned

the worsened

condition.

627, 639 P.2d 677, 678 (1982).
his

industrial

arm

and

hand

had

Grable v. Weyerhaeuser, 55
Mr. McKean would not have

it not

been

for

the original

accident and his conduct was not negligent in light of

his knowledge at that time.
CONCLUSION
Mr.
natural

McKean's

burn

injury

is compensable because it was a

consequence of the original industrial injury and was not

the result of Mr. McKeanfs own negligent conduct.
Based on the foregoing, the Industrial Ctonmiss ion's denial of
appellant's Motion for Review should be upheld.
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day of May, 1985.

CORPORDN & WILLIAMS

CHRIS D. NICHOLS
Attorney for Respondent
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